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Accounting Rules Fueling the 
International Banking Crisis
By Sharon M. McKinnon and James F. Volkert
Some corporate debtors have prob­
lems satisfying their financial obliga­
tions during periods of depressed 
economic conditions or other financial 
hardship. Consequently, debt obliga­
tions are often restructured to permit 
the debtor either to defer or to reduce 
the interest or the principal obligation. 
There is considerable variety in the 
form these restructurings may take. 
Not surprisingly, in the absence of 
guidelines before 1977, there was also 
considerable variety in the ways that 
both debtors and creditors accounted 
for these events.
Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 15, effective for restruc­
turings occurring after December 31, 
1977, prescribes accounting treatment 
for both extinguishments and revised 
loan covenants of debts defined as 
“troubled.” While the statement could 
be said to have resolved the con­
sistency and comparability problems 
associated with troubled debt, its issu­
ance did little to advance the FASB’s 
claims as an impartial standard-setting 
body devoted to theoretical con­
sistency.
Several issues merit a re­
examination, over six years later, of the 
circumstances surrounding issuance 
of SFAS No. 15. First, economic events 
of the mid-1970’s played a significant 
role in the promulgation of standards 
on troubled debt restructurings. These 
economic factors have loomed even 
larger in the early 1980’s and provide 
a startling example of how accounting 
and reporting requirements can signifi­
cantly interact with macroeconomic 
events. Second, the ability of one 
industry group to impose its viewpoint 
on the standard-setting process war­
rants analysis in retrospect of the con­
sequences of the FASB’s acquies­
cence. Third, in light of subsequent 
issuances in the FASB’s conceptual
International debt crises are 
putting pressure on the World 
Bank to take action.
framework project, the choices made 
in SFAS No. 15 appear all the more 
indefensible.
Historical Setting for SFAS 
No. 15
Several factors contributed to an 
increase in loan restructurings in the 
mid-1970’s. The real estate market 
experienced a dramatic recession, 
much to the dismay of the commercial 
banks investing heavily in Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs). Debt re­
structurings occurred as a result of 
tightening financial conditions. Com­
pounding these problems was the fis­
cal distress of large entities such as 
Penn Central, W. T. Grant, and the city 
of New York.
In addition, banks had increased 
their foreign loans substantially. Large 
deposits of dollars by oil-producing 
countries allowed banks to loan dollars 
to developing countries. They in turn 
used the dollars to purchase oil, and 
dollars were again deposited by the oil­
producers. This cycle dramatically 
increased the availability of dollar- 
denominated loans. In hindsight, the 
problems caused by liberal loans to 
developing countries appear easy to 
predict, but for several years the sig­
nificant growth of many less developed 
countries postponed what now seems 
so inevitable.
Accounting Choices
Various events can occur when a 
debtor is faced with difficulties in ful­
filling a debt obligation. One course of 
action is to settle the debt on some 
terms agreeable to both parties, 
usually resulting in an economic loss 
to the creditor. The creditor may 
believe that some lesser repayment is 
better than to chance losing the entire 
amount owed. Accounting and report­
ing of this type of definite transaction 
is relatively straightforward because 
the traditional accounting model 
“sees” the settlement as an income or 
expense recognition event within the 
standard accounting framework.
What is more difficult to address is 
a continuation of the debt with a modifi­
cation in terms, generally consisting of 
a lower interest rate, lower principal 
amount, or extended time to repay. 
The nature of these concessions is that 
the debtor will economically benefit 
and the creditor will lose. Whether or 
not the concession itself is an event 
worthy of triggering immediate recog-
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nition of this loss was the controversial 
issue confronting the FASB in 1977.
Exhibit 1 provides a simple numeri­
cal example of how changes in terms 
can affect the present value of a loan. 
The original loan of $10,000 is 
recorded by both parties at its face 
value (ignoring complications such as 
discounted notes). In addition to being 
face value, this is also the present 
value of the loan, as demonstrated in 
the exhibit. Each of the three modifi­
cations in terms reduces the present 
value of the loan, yet in each the abso­
lute amount of cash to be received 
over the life of the debt exceeds the 
original amount of $10,000.
Prevalent practice before 1977 for 
restructurings was not to change the 
carrying amount of the loan receivable 
to reflect a new present value unless 
the change was a reduction of prin­
cipal. Instead of immediate recognition 
that a loss had occurred, future interest 
income was reduced. Most financial 
institutions, in many cases adhering to 
state or federal banking laws, take 
other steps to deal with problem loans. 
Accrual of overdue interest income 
ceases after a certain time. For exam­
ple, New York banking laws prohibit 
recognition of interest income that is 
thirty days past the billing due date. 
U.S. regulations allow ninety days. 
Levels of allowances for loan losses 
are tied to estimates of potential loan 
portfolio risk and closely correlated to 
the amount of “non-performing” loans.
But banks have been particularly 
reluctant to recognize immediately the 
economic losses associated with res­
tructuring. When the FASB issued a 
Discussion Memorandum in 1976 
which addressed various suggested 
proposals for dealing with restructur­
ings, the response from the banking 
industry was overwhelmingly negative. 
The Board received close to 900 let­
ters of comment, most from bankers. 
According to Marshall Armstrong, then 
chairman of the FASB, most of the 
responses failed to discuss the issues, 
being “unreasoned protests against 
current value accounting.”
Of the five alternatives in the Discus­
sion Memorandum, four involved some 
approach to recognizing the current 
value of the loan receivable by using 
present value techniques. By focusing 
on the controversial terminology “cur­
rent value,” the banking industry tried 
to shift its arguments to a theoretical 
level. Most of the controversy sur­
rounding “current value” accounting 
concerns difficulties in determining the 
worth of tangible assets. Debt obliga­
tions with fixed terms actually provide 
ideal examples of assets whose true 
value is quite easily determinable.
The arguments to postpone use of 
present value until formulation of a 
conceptual framework were merely 
window dressing for more pragmatic 
objections. All the current value 
methods would result in larger addi­
tions to loan loss reserves than the 
historical methods in use at that time. 
Federal Reserve regulations are quite 
strict regarding the size of these 
reserves. When a loan becomes a bad 
debt, the bank must adjust its loan loss 
reserves. These reserves act as offsets 
EXHIBIT 1
Terms of Original Loan: Principal-$10,000; Interest-12%; Term-5 years




Recorded amount of loan $10,000
Modifications:
1. Change interest rate to 8 percent:










2. Change principal to $8,000:
Present Value: Principal-$8,000 x .56743 









3. Change life to 8 years with the same absolute amount of 
interest as for previous 5 years life:
Present Value: Principal-$10,000 x .40388 









to banks’ primary capital, of which 
American banks are required to main­
tain $1 for every $20 in outstanding 
loans. Because banks generally stay 
as close to that ratio as possible, writ­
ing off losses due to restructuring 
could reduce lending by some 20 times 
the capital loss. This threat of 
decreased income could discourage 
banks from renegotiating loans and 
have negative effects on firms in finan­
cial distress.
The FASB Reaction
The banking industry was granted a 
reprieve by the provisions of Statement 
No. 15, issued in June 1977. The 
FASB reacted to the negative 
response to its Discussion Memoran­
dum by prescribing standards which 
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A look should be taken at 
how theory and reality relate 
to the standard-setting 
process.
basically continued existing practice. 
Instead of recognition of losses in the 
value of receivables, increased dis­
closure was deemed sufficient.
Statement No. 15 applied only to 
troubled debt restructurings defined as 
occurring when . .the creditor for 
economic or legal reasons related to 
the debtor’s financial difficulties grants 
a concession to the debtor it would not 
otherwise consider.” In the case where 
the debt is settled, gains and losses 
are recognized by each party based on 
the fair value of assets exchanged in 
relation to the recorded value of the 
debt.
When debt is continued with a 
modification in terms, treatment 
depends upon the amount of the total 
future cash flows. If this total is less 
than the carrying amount of the debt 
(a rare situation), gains and losses are 
recognized. If, however, the new terms 
result in total future cash flows greater 
than the carrying amount of the debt, 
no gain or loss is recognized by either 
party. Instead, a new effective interest 
rate is used to recognize a smaller 
amount of interest revenue or expense 
over the remaining life of the debt. No 
distinction was made as to the type of 
change. Accounting for reductions in 
face amount was made consistent with 
other modifications.
Theoretical Inconsistencies
As highlighted previously, much of 
the dissent of the banking industry 
focused on their displeasure with cur­
rent value accounting. Letters cited a 
desire to let the FASB complete its 
conceptual framework project instead 
of taking a “piecemeal” approach with 
regard to one industry. The interven­
ing seven years have produced 
several Statements of Financial 
Accounting Concepts in the framework 
project. Analysis of Statement No. 15 
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in conjunction with these conceptual 
pronouncements indicates that the 
debt restructuring statement exhibits 
serious deficiencies.
The FASB has continually empha­
sized that conceptual framework 
pronouncements are suggestive rather 
than definitive. It has also disclaimed 
attempts to apply concepts retroac­
tively to prior statements. But given the 
obvious concurrent work on concepts 
and actual statements, it does not 
seem to be asking too much to expect 
some consistency in standards. State­
ment No. 15 presents an unfortunate 
example where the FASB appears to 
have thrown out the theory when the 
political pressures intervened.
This is not to say that industry pres­
sure always produces unwanted con­
sequences. Economic aftereffects of 
standards are at least as important as 
internal theoretical consistency, and 
industry is frequently most cognizant 
of what standards will do to their oper­
ations and the economy in which they 
interact. But it does warrant a look at 
how theory and reality relate to the 
standard-setting process.
Objectives of Financial Reporting. 
As part of the conceptual framework, 
the FASB defines the purposes of 
financial reporting. The three primary 
objectives are to provide (1) informa­
tion useful in investment and credit 
decisions, (2) information useful in 
assessing cash flow prospects, and (3) 
information about enterprise 
resources, claims to those resources 
and changes in them. For industries 
whose resources consist materially of 
monetary assets and liabilities, the 
course prescribed by Statement No. 15 
appears to run counter to each of 
these objectives.
Consider the example in Exhibit 1. 
A firm holding the $10,000 receivable 
would suffer an economic loss under 
any of the three modifications. Under 
Statement No. 15, there would be no 
loss on the income statement and no 
indication on the balance sheet that 
assets were less valuable than before 
the restructuring. The negative effects 
on future cash flows are obscured; the 
changes in the value of the enterprises 
resources are ignored; and potential 
debt or equity investors are forced to 
rely on additional disclosures to ana­
lyze what is really happening in the 
firm.
And what of the additional dis­
closures? The Statement prescribes 
that creditors disclose the income that 
would have been recorded in the 
period ignoring restructure in compar­
ison to that which was recorded. Com­
mitments to lend additional funds are 
also disclosed. It does not require dis­
closure of information that would en­
able investors to assess future cash 
flows. In addition, the FASB specifi­
cally allows firms to choose their own 
forms of disclosure. The disclosure 
requirements can be met by discus­
sion of reduced earnings potential 
of entire portfolios of receivables, 
grouped into major categories, without 
separate mention of troubled restruc­
tured receivables. Thus it is generally 
impossible for the user of financial 
statements to determine the effects of 
debt restructurings on the firm.
What is a transaction? The tradi­
tional accounting model records 
assets at their historical cost. Because 
this cost is not changed to reflect 
changes in value, the model has been 
subject to criticism that cost loses rel­
evance as it diverges from value, and 
that value should replace cost in a new 
accounting model. Bankers objected 
to being among the first to be subject 
to new current value techniques.
Transactions are not 
prerequisites for accrual­
based accounting systems, 
but existence of economic 
substance and change are.
But parties on both sides of the cur­
rent value/historical cost debate agree 
that the two are identical at the 
moment of the arms’ length transac­
tion between parties. The primary flaw 
in the outcry against using present 
value to measure the value of the re­
structured receivable is the misunder­
standing of this fact. Present value is 
merely the technique that is used to 
measure value, and at the point of the 
transaction it is the technique used to 
measure cost as well. The $10,000 
recorded value of the original transac­
tion is historical cost. It is a combina­
tion of the present value of the 
principal to be received in five years 
and the present value of the stream of 
interest cash flows over five years.
The key to what the receivable 
should reflect concerns not whether or 
not present value techniques should 
be used but whether or not a transac­
tion has occurred which triggers deter­
mination of a new “cost” to the firm. 
The FASB rationale was that a trans­
action of substance has not occurred. 
Without a transaction, no new carrying 
value (and consequently no recog­
nized loss) is required.
Not only is this argument itself with­
out merit, but it is also one which 
appears to be trotted out when ration­
ale is needed for selected pronounce­
ments and completely ignored for 
others. Transactions are not prerequi­
sites for accrual-based accounting sys­
tems, but existence of economic 
substance and change are. Wearing 
out of fixed assets is of sufficient eco­
nomic significance to record periodic 
depreciation. Gains and losses on for­
eign currency commitments are 
accrued for reporting because 
exchange rate changes indicate eco­
nomic gain or loss. Leases which are 
sales in disguise must be capitalized 
and depreciated, regardless of the lack 
of “ownership.” Even more closely 
tied to the debt restructuring situation 
are accruals of losses for warranties 
and contingent liabilities. In each case 
the present period is assessed for 
losses expected to physically occur in 
the future. This accounting is justified 
on the basis that the future losses will 
result from events that have already 
occurred, and in spite of the necessity 
to estimate.
Troubled debt restructurings are no 
different in concept. Future losses will 
occur because of new loan terms, 
transacted in the present and precisely 
measurable. The old recorded value 
incorporated expectations of future 
income. A transaction has occurred 
and new expectations of reduced 
future income should define a new 
historical cost.
Public Pressure
Restructuring of debt joined that 
group of controversial issues where 
special interest groups influence deci­
sions to ignore economic substance 
with the argument of “no transaction.” 
Most prominent among these is non­
accounting for pension liabilities. Pub­
lic outcry against FASB proposals to 
recognize unfunded pensions as liabil­
ities may very well result in theory 
again taking a back seat.
The FASB is in an unenviable posi­
tion, fighting for its existence between 
two formidable parties. On one hand, 
business demands favorable account­
ing standards; on the other the SEC 
expects standards to keep business in 
line. Funding comes from the business 
community; the right to exist from the
Business demands favorable 
accounting standards; the 
SEC expects standards to 
keep business in line.
SEC. It is little wonder that pronounce­
ments frequently reflect desperate 
attempts to keep each at bay. Unfor­
tunately, evidence increasingly sug­
gests that the FASB will not stand up 
to strong business lobbying. Com­
plaints of income fluctuations by mul­
tinational businesses led to rescission 
of Statement No. 8 on foreign currency 
translation. Accounting for changing 
prices was only addressed after the 
SEC stepped in with its own require­
ments. And the FASB was never able 
to get past business’ objections to its 
proposals for dealing with the con­
troversial sales/leasebacks of invest­
ment tax credit assets allowed by the 
first Reagan tax bill. On that subject no 
definitive pronouncement was ever 
issued.
Economic Reality
Theoretical inconsistency and bow­
ing to industry pressure have both 
been defended by arguments invoking 
potential effects of accounting rules on 
“the greater good.” Statement No. 8 
The accounting rules which 
allowed banks to postpone 
recognizing economic losses 
have had more negative than 
positive economic 
consequences.
was said to inspire inefficient foreign 
currency management practices and 
was even accused of contributing to 
the decline of the dollar. The same 
type of arguments were advanced by 
the banking lobbying efforts for State­
ment No. 15. Bankers claimed that 
recognizing losses would stifle the 
economy by inhibiting loans to needy 
parties and by drying up capital 
reserves. It is true that, in the face of 
severe macroeconomic effects, an 
insistence on theoretical consistency 
appears trivial. To analyze this argu­
ment, it is necessary to consider what 
economic effects Statement No. 15 has 
contributed to in its brief history.
The major effect of the statement is 
that it allows creditors to avoid reduc­
ing their income, with the concurrent 
effects on capital, as long as new 
terms guarantee that future cash flows 
equal or exceed the debt’s carrying 
amount. If the debt were instead set­
tled for whatever the creditor could get, 
a loss would ensue. This is the real 
inefficiency of the statement: creditors 
are lured into the more pleasing route 
of income statement restructuring, 
despite the real possibility that they 
would be economically better off to set­
tle immediately.
One has to look at the events in the 
international lending community to 
understand the negative economic 
reality that has been fueled by an 
accounting anomaly. Since 1973, debt 
of the 16 largest third world debtors 
has increased by over $480 billion 
reaching $520 billion by early 1985. 
As the dollar strengthened with high 
interest rates, many of these countries 
began experiencing disruptions of debt 
servicing in the early 1980’s. About 
two-thirds of this debt is in trouble. In 
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1981, $2.6 billion debt was resche­
duled; in 1985 it may reach or exceed 
$100 billion.
As long as the debtors can continue 
borrowing enough to pay interest on 
old loans, the merry-go-round con­
tinues. When debtors begin faltering, 
the recycling slows. Some worried cre­
ditors, usually the least exposed, stop 
throwing good money after bad. 
Others are too involved to cut their 
losses. If you owe the bank $1000 and 
cannot pay, it is your problem. If you 
owe the banks $300 billion and cannot 
pay, the banks are in trouble. Consider 
Citibank, for example. As the largest 
U.S. bank, it has capital of $5.5 billion. 
Citibank’s Brazilian loans alone 
amount to $4.4 billion. Manufacturers 
Hanover has $3.7 billion, 112 percent 
of its net worth, tied up in loans to Bra­
zil and Argentina. Chase Manhattan 
also has $3.6 billion, or 92 percent of 
its net worth, in loans to the same two 
countries. The nine largest U.S. banks 
together have $28 billion in capital, but 
$64 billion in loans outstanding to trou­
bled economies.1 One year of no 
interest or principal payments from 
Latin America would eliminate all 
profits and most capital of these U.S. 
banks. If Brazil, Argentina, and Mex­
ico decided to join forces and repudi­
ate their debts, the nine largest U.S. 
banks would be wiped out.
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Of course this will not happen. 
Governments, both of debt troubled 
countries and strong banking coun­
tries, cannot allow the massive col­
lapse of the international monetary 
system this situation portends. Efforts 
are being made by the International 
Monetary Fund, groups of debtor 
countries, and others to forestall each 
confrontation between bank and 
debtor country. The banks may come 
out in the end solely because they are 
too vital to let go under.
Whatever the ultimate resolution of 
the crisis, it is obvious that the 
accounting rules which allowed banks 
to postpone recognizing economic 
losses have had more negative than 
positive economic consequences. 
What would have happened given the 
necessity to write down restructured 
loans is impossible to reconstruct. But 
in retrospect it is easy to believe that 
the loan merry-go-round would have 
slowed more gradually, with time for 
the world economy to readjust, than 
face the present fear of total collapse. 
Conclusion
Standard setting for financial report­
ing is a complex process affected con­
currently by the need to serve 
numerous masters, maintain theoreti­
cal consistency, and accommodate the 
realities of the world economic struc­
ture. Ideally, financial reporting should
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measure and report behavior, not 
become the object of behavior. The 
accounting principle should not 
influence the economic decision, but 
merely report it. The troubled debt 
pronouncement is an unfortunate 
example where all the negative factors 
came into place at one time. The pri­
mary arguments against recognizing 
losses on restructuring were theoreti­
cal consistency and the potential 
effects on the economy. The resulting 
statement is a model for inconsistency, 
and has probably exacerbated the 
largest financial crisis in history. The 
FASB’s pronouncement provides 
heavy fuel for those parties who 
scorn the ability of business and 
the accounting profession to regulate 
themselves.Ω
NOTE
1Von Hoffman, Nicholas, The New Republic, 
October 14, 1985, pp. 21-22.
Home Office Deduction
from page 13
by looking to the nature of the business 
activities, the attributes of the space in 
which the business activities can be 
carried out and the necessity of using 
a home office to carry out such 
activities.
While the Weissman decision is rela­
tively narrow in scope, many university 
professors may be able to apply their 
factual situations thereto in substan­
tiating a home office deduction.fi
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